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lcsh
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Work cat.: Richard, M. Propositional attitudes : an essay on thoughts and how we ascribe them, 1990.
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Encyc. of philosophy, c2006, via WWW, Aug. 10, 2007 (Two entries: "Propositional Attitudes: Issues in Semantics" and "Propositional
Attitudes: Issues in the Philosophy of Mind and Psychology"; propositional attitudes like knowledge, belief, and assertion
play an important foundational role for semantic theory; often cited as the paradigmatic example of this mental state.)
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Sutherland dict. of psychology, 1996 (propositional attitude (Philosophy): any proposition expressing an attitude towards
some aspect of the world, e.g. a belief, hope, fear, doubt, wish, etc.)
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Concise Routledge encyc. of philosophy, 2000, via WWW, Aug. 10, 2007: propositional attitude statements (Propositional attitude
statements--statements about our beliefs, desires, hopes and fears--exhibit certain logical peculiarities)
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Stanford encyc. of philosophy, via WWW, Aug. 10, 2007 (Propositional attitude reports concern the cognitive relations people
bear to propositions)
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Blackburn, S. The Oxford dict. of philosophy, 1994 (propositional attitudes: the term suggests that knowing what someone believes,
etc. is a matter of identifying an abstract object of their thought, rather than understanding his or her orientation towards
more worldly objects.)
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The Cambridge dict. of philosophy, 1999 (propositional attitude, under proposition: an abstract object said to be that to
which a person is related by a belief, desire, or other psychological attitude, typically expressed in language containing
a psychological verb ("think," "deny," "doubt," etc. followed by a that-clause. The psychological states in question are called
propositional attitudes.)
